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Abstract
The provability logic of a theory T captures the structural behavior of
formalized provability in T as provable in T itself. Like provability, one
can formalize the notion of relative interpretability giving rise to inter-
pretability logics. Where provability logics are the same for all moderately
sound theories of some minimal strength, interpretability logics do show
variations.
The logic IL(All) is defined as the collection of modal principles that
are provable in any moderately sound theory of some minimal strength.
In this paper we raise the previously known lower bound of IL(All) by
exhibiting two series of principles which are shown to be provable in any
such theory. Moreover, we compute the collection of frame conditions for
both series.
1 Introduction
Relative interpretations in the sense of Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson [10] are
widely used in mathematics and in mathematical logic to interpret one theory
into another. Roughly speaking, such an interpretation between two theories is
a translation from the language of one theory to the language of the other so
that the translation preserves logical structure and theoremhood.
We shall write U ⊲ V to denote that a theory U interprets a theory V .
Once we know that U ⊲ V , this provides us much information; for example
the consistency of U implies the consistency of V and also, various definability
results carry over from the one theory to the other. Famous examples of inter-
pretations are abundant: the theory of the natural numbers into the theory of
the integers, set theory plus the continuum hypothesis into ordinary set theory,
non-Euclidean geometry into Euclidean geometry, etc.
Interpretability, being a syntactical notion, allows for formalization very
much as one can formalize the notion of provability. As such, we can consider
interpretability logics which actually extend the well-know provability logic GL
of Go¨del Lo¨b. We shall see that the interpretability logic of a theory is the
collection of all structural properties of interpretability that it can prove.
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Where all modestly correct theories of some minimal strength –let us call
them reasonable theories in this paper– have the same provability logic GL, the
situation is different in the case of interpretability and different theories have
different logics. It is an open question to determine the logic of interpretabil-
ity principles being provable in any reasonable theory. This paper reports on
substantial progress on this open question by increasing the previously known
lower bound.
2 Preliminaries
Let U and V denote theories with languages LU and LV respectively. A relative
interpretation j from V into a theory U –we will write j : U ⊲ V – is a pair
〈δ(x), t〉 where δ(x) is a formula of LU that specifies the domain in which V will
be interpreted and t is a translation, mapping symbols of LV to formulas of LU
providing a definition in U of these symbols.
The translation t is extended to a translation j of formulas in the usual
way by having j commute with the connectives and relativize the quantifiers
to the domain specifier δ(x) as follows:
(
∀x ϕ(x)
)j
:= ∀x
(
δ(x) → ϕj(x)
)
. We
will not go too much into details but the main point is that interpretations are
primarily syntactical notions –especially for finite languages– and as such allow
for an arithmetization/formalization very much as formal proofs do.
2.1 Arithmetic
In order to formalize the notion of interpretability within some base theory T
one needs to require some minimal strength conditions on T . In particular, we
shall require that T can speak of numbers where to code syntax and without
loss of generality we shall assume that T contains the language of arithmetic
{+,×, S, 0, 1 <,=}.
We will need that the main properties of the basic syntactical operations like
substitution are provable within T . For reasonable coding protocols this implies
that we need to require the totality of a function of growth-rate ω1(x) := x 7→
22|x| where |x| denotes the integral part of the binary logarithm of x.
Further, to perform basic arguments we need a minimal amount of induction
and actually a surprisingly little amount of induction suffices. Buss’s theory S12
has just the needed amount of induction and proves the totality of ω1 and this
shall be our base theory (formulated in the standard language of arithmetic).
Alternatively, we could have taken as base theory I∆0+Ω1 which consists of
Robinson’s arithmetic Q together with induction for bounded formulas with pa-
rameters and the axiom Ω1 stating that the graph of ω1 defines a total function.
We refer the reader to [5] and [2] for further details.
A sharply bounded quantifier is one of the form ∀x<|y| where |y| denotes
the integer value of the binary logarithm of y. The class ∆b0 contains exactly
the formulas where each quantifier is sharply bounded. The class Σ1b arises by
2
allowing bounded existential quantifiers and sharply bounded universal quan-
tifiers to occur over ∆b0 formulas. By ∃Σ
1
b we denote those formulas that arise
by allowing a single unbounded existential quantifier over a Σ1b formula. The
complexity classes Πn, Σn and ∆n refer to the usual quantifier alternations
hierarchies in the standard language of arithmetic.
In this paper we shall only be concerned with first order-theories in the
language of arithmetic with a poly-time recognizable set of axioms extending S12
and shall often refrain from repeating (some of) these conditions. We shall write
Tφ as the ∃Σ
b
1 formalization of φ being provable in the theory T and refrain
from distinguishing formulas from their Go¨del numbers or even the numerals
thereof. It is well known that we can express provable Σ1 completeness using
formalized provability.
Lemma 2.1. For any theory T extending S12 we have that
T ⊢ ∀α Tα→ TTα.
We will use U ⊲ V to denote the formalization of “the theory V is inter-
pretable in the theory U”. If we abbreviate the existential quantifier over num-
bers that code a pair 〈δ(x), t〉 defining an interpretation by ∃intj we can write
U ⊲ V := ∃intj ∀ψ (V ψ → Uψ
j). (1)
An interpretation j : U ⊲ V can be used as a uniform way to obtain a
model of V inside any model of U . If U satisfies full induction, then we see that
actually the defined model of V is an end extension of the model of U : we define
f(0) := 0 and f(x+ 1) := f(x) +j 1j and by induction see that ∀x∃y f(x) = y.
As such, we see that any Σ1 consequence of U must necessarily also hold in V .
Since Tϕ is a Σ1 formula, the insight on end extensions is reflected in what is
called Montagna’s principle
(U ⊲ V )→
(
(U ∪ {Tϕ})⊲ (V ∪ {Tϕ})
)
. (2)
In case U does not have full induction, we can still define the graph F (x, y) of
the function f from above, but we can no longer prove that the function is total.
However, we can prove that ∃y F (x, y) is progressive, that is, we can prove
∃y F (0, y) ∧ ∀x
(
∃y F (x, y)→ ∃y, F (x + 1, y)
)
.
In particular, the formula ∃y F (x, y) defines an initial segment within U . A
common trick in weak arithmetics is to use this initial segment as our natural
numbers instead of applying induction (which is not necessarily available). By
Solovay’s techniques on shortening initial segments we may assume that they
obey certain closure properties giving rise to the what is called a definable cut.
A formula J is called a T -cut whenever T proves all of
1. J(0) ∧ ∀x (J(x)→ J(x+ 1));
2. ∀x
(
J(x) ∧ J(y)→ J(x + y) ∧ J(xy) ∧ J(ω1(x))
)
;
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3. J(x) ∧ y < x→ J(y).
Let Cut(J) denote the conjunction of these three requirements. Sometimes we
want to quantify over cuts within T so that these cuts can then of course be
non-standard. We shall use ∀CutJ ψ and ∃CutJ ψ to denote ∀J (TCut(J˙)→ ψ)
and ∃J (TCut(J˙)∧ψ) respectively. Here the dot notation in TCut(J˙) is the
standard way to abbreviate the formula with one free variable J stating that the
formula Cut(J) is provable in T . We will freely use the dot notation throughout
the remainder of this paper. Sometimes we shall write x∈J instead of J(x).
For J a cut, let ψJ denote the formula where all unrestricted quantifiers are
now required to range over values in J . That is, (∀x φ)J := ∀x (J(x) → φJ ),
(∃x φ)J := ∃x (J(x) ∧ φJ ). Moreover, that is the only thing that is done
by this translation so that for example (φ ∧ ψ)J := φJ ∧ ψJ etc. Instead of
writing (Tφ)
J we shall simply write JTφ. We note that if ψ(J) ∈ ∃Σ
b
1, then
∃CutJ ψ(J) is again provably equivalent to an ∃Σb1 formula.
Let us get back to the role of induction in Montagna’s principle. If j :
U ⊲ V and U does not prove full induction, then j will not define an end
extension of any model of U . However, it is easy to see that j does define,
using the progressive formula ∃y F (x, y), a definable cut in U on which f is
an isomorphism. This is reflected in a weakening of Montagna’s principle also
referred to as Pudla´k’s principle.
Lemma 2.2. Let T be a theory containing S1
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and let U and V be theories.
T ⊢ U ⊲ V → ∃CutJ ∀ψ∈∆0
(
U ∪ {(∃xψ)J˙}⊲ V ∪ {∃xψ}
)
. (3)
2.2 The interpretability logic of a theory
Interpretability logics are designed to capture structural behavior of formalized
interpretability just as provability logic captures the structural behavior of for-
malized provability. To this end we consider a propositional modal language
with a unary modal operator  to model formalized provability and a binary
modal operator ⊲ to model formalized interpretability of sentential extensions
of some base theory. Let us make this more precise.
Let us fix an arithmetical theory T ; By ∗ we will denote a realization, that
is, any mapping from the set of propositional variables to sentences of T . The
map ∗ is extended to the set of all modal formulas of interpretability logics as
follows
(¬A)∗ := ¬A∗
(A ∧B)∗ := A∗ ∧B∗ and likewise for the other connectives
(A)∗ := TA
∗
(A⊲B)∗ := (T +A∗)⊲ (T +B∗).
We can now define the interpretability logic of a theory as those modal principles
which are provable under any realization. With some liberal notation this is
captured in the following.
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Definition 2.3. Let T be a theory containing S12. We define the interpretability
logic of T as
IL(T) := {A | ∀ ∗ T ⊢ A∗}.
Further, we define the interpretability logic of all arithmetical theories extending
S12 by
IL(All) := {A | ∀T ∀ ∗ T ⊢ A∗}.
As a direct corollary to (2) –Montagna’s principle– we can conclude that
(A⊲B)→
(
(A ∧C)⊲ (B ∧C)
)
∈ IL(T)
whenever T proves full induction. However, there is no direct reflection of
Pudla´k’s principle on the level of interpretability logics since Pudla´k’s principle
would translate to
(A⊲B)→
(
(A ∧JC)⊲ (B ∧C)
)
∈ IL(T)
for the particular cut J corresponding to j : A⊲B and this cannot be expressed
in our modal language. In a sense, JC corresponds to finding a small witness
of the provability of C. As we shall see, there are various occasions where we can
conclude that such small witnesses exist. The two main ingredients in obtaining
such small witnesses are expressed by the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.4 (Outside big, inside small). For T, U any theories extending S12,
we have that
T ⊢ ∀CutJ ∀x U (x˙ ∈ J˙).
Proof. Given J and given x, not necessarily in J , we can construct a proof-
object to the extent that x ∈ J in the obvious way. First conclude J(0) which
holds since J is a cut. Next, conclude that J(1) from the progressiveness of
J and J(0) and so all the way to J(x). This proof object is not much bigger
than x itself. However it requires the totality of exponentiation. If this is not
provable in T , the proof can be generalized by switching do dyadic numerals
and we refer to e.g. [2, 7] for details.
Lemma 2.5 (Formalized Henkin construction). For theories T, U and V all
extending S12 we have
T ⊢ ∀CutJ (U ∪ {ConJ (V )}⊲ V ).
Proof. (Sketch) The theory T can verify that the usual Henkin construction
can be formalized in U without many problems where J plays the role of the
natural numbers. Instead of applying induction to obtain a maximal consistent
set MV as a consistent branch of infinite length in Lindenbaum’s lemma, we
can now only conclude that the length of the branch is within some cut I which
is a shortening of J thereby yielding a setMIV which is contradiction-free on I.
The setMIV can be used to obtain a term model and we define an interpre-
tation j : (U ∪ {ConJ(V )}⊲ V ) from the term model as usual so that provably
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φj ↔
(
φ ∈MIV
)
. Note that since the interpretation of identity can be any equiv-
alence relation, there is no need to move to equivalence classes in the construc-
tion of our term model. By construction we have U∀φ
(
Con
J(V )∧IV φ→ φ
j
)
.
By the outside big, inside small principle and the formalized deduction theorem
we now conclude that
∀φ (V ϕ→ U∪{ConJ (V )}ϕ)
which, by (1) is nothing but (U ∪ {ConJ(V )} ⊲ V ). We refer to [13] where one
can see that the necessary induction for this argument is available in S12.
Using these lemmas we can infer in various occasions the existence of small
witnesses to provability.
Lemma 2.6. For any theory T we have T ⊢ ¬(A⊲¬C)→ ∀CutK♦(A∧K˙C).
Proof. Reason in arbitrary T by contraposition and apply the Henkin construc-
tion on a cut.
As a corollary to this lemma, we see that (A⊲B)→
(
¬(A⊲¬C)⊲(B∧C)
)
∈
IL(T) for any T extending S12. It is an open problem to classify the modal
principles that hold in any theory extending S12. This paper raises the previously
known lower bound.
We formulate some other direct corollaries of the outside-big inside-small
principle in the following useful lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Let T be any theory containing S1
2
. We have that
1. T ⊢ ∀A (A˙→ ∀CutK K˙A˙ );
2. T ⊢ σ → ∀CutK σK˙ for any formula σ in ∃Σb1;
3. T ⊢ ∀C∈∃Σb1 ∀
CutJ (∃xC →  ∃x∈J˙ C).
One ingredient in proving interpretability principles arithmetically sound,
is to find small witnesses. Another ingredient tells us how we can keep these
witnesses small. A simple generalization of Pudla´k’s lemma which was first
proved in [6] and tells us how to do so.
Lemma 2.8. If j : α ⊲ β then, for every cut I there exists a definable cut J
such that for every γ we have that
T ⊢ ∀CutI ∃CutJ ∃intj
(
j : (α ∧Jγ)⊲ (β ∧Iγ)
)
.
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2.3 Modal interpretability logics
When working in interpretability logic, we shall adopt a reading convention
that will allow us to omit many brackets. Thus, we say that the strongest
binding ‘connectives’ are ¬,  and ♦ which all bind equally strong. Next come
∧ and ∨, followed by ⊲ and the weakest connective is →. Thus, for example,
A⊲B → A∧C⊲B∧C will be short for (A⊲B)→
(
(A∧C)⊲ (B∧C)
)
.
If we do not disambiguate a formula of nested conditionals (→ or ⊲), then
this should be read as a conjunction. For example, A ⊲ B ⊲ C should be read
as (A⊲B) ∧ (B ⊲ C) and likewise for implications.
We first define the core logic IL which shall be present in any other inter-
pretability logic. As before, we work in a propositional signature where apart
from the classical connectives we have a unary modal operator  and a binary
modal operator ⊲.
Definition 2.9 (IL). The logic IL contains apart from all propositional logical
tautologies, all instantiations of the following axiom schemes.
L1 (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
L2 A→ A
L3 (A→ A)→ A
J1 (A→ B)→ A⊲B
J2 (A⊲B) ∧ (B ⊲ C)→ A⊲ C
J3 (A⊲ C) ∧ (B ⊲ C)→ A ∨B ⊲ C
J4 A⊲B → (♦A→ ♦B)
J5 ♦A⊲A
The rules of the logic are Modus Ponens (from A→ B and A, conclude B)
and Necessitation (from A conclude A).
It is not hard to see that IL ⊆ IL(All). By ILM we denote the logic that
arises by adding Montagna’s axiom scheme
M : A⊲B → A ∧C ⊲B ∧C
to IL. It follows from our earlier observations that ILM ⊆ IL(T) and the other
inclusion can be proven too.
Theorem 2.10 (Berarducci [1], Shavrukov [9]). If T proves full induction, then
IL(T) = ILM.
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The logic ILP arises by adding the axiom scheme
P : A⊲B → (A⊲B)
to the basic logic IL. If T is finitely axiomatizable it is easy to see that (1)
is provably equivalent to a Σ1 formula so that by provable Σ1 completeness
we see that ILP ⊆ IL(T) for any finitely axiomatized theory T that proves
that exponentiation is a total function. If T can moreover prove the totality
of superexponentiation supexp then the inclusion can be reversed too. Here,
supexp(x) is defined as x 7→ 2xx with 2
n
0 := n and 2
n
m+1 := 2
(2n
m
).
Theorem 2.11 (Visser [12]). If T is finitely axiomatizable and proves the to-
tality of supexp, then IL(T) = ILP.
It follows that IL ⊆ IL(All) ⊆ (ILP∩ ILM). In this paper we shall focus on
these bounds.
2.4 Relational semantics
We can equip interpretability logics with a natural relational semantics often
referred to as Veltman semantics.
Definition 2.12. A Veltman frame is a triple 〈W,R, {Sx}x∈W 〉 where W is
a non-empty set of possible worlds, R a binary relation on W so that R−1 is
transitive and well-founded. The {Sx}x∈W is a collection of binary relations on
x ↑ (where x ↑:= {y | xRy}). The requirements are that the Sx are reflexive and
transitive and the restriction of R to x ↑ is contained in Sx, that is R ∩ (x ↑) ⊆
Sx.
A Veltman model consists of a Veltman frame together with a valuation
V : Prop → P(W ) that assigns to each propositional variable p ∈ Prop a set
of worlds V (p) in W where p is stipulated to be true. This valuation defines
a forcing relation  ⊆ W×Form telling us which formulas are true at which
particular world:
x  ⊥ for no x ∈W ;
x  A→ B :⇔ x 1 A or x  B;
x  A :⇔ ∀y (xRy → y  A);
x  A⊲B :⇔ ∀y
(
xRy ∧ y  A→ ∃z (ySxz ∧ z  B
)
.
For a Veltman model M = 〈W,R, {Sx}x∈W , V 〉, we shall write M |= A as short
for ∀x∈W M, x  A.
The logic IL is sound and complete with respect to all Veltman models ([3]).
Often one is interested in considering all models that can be defined over a
frame. Thus, given a frame F and a valuation V on F we shall denote the
corresponding model by 〈F , V 〉. A frame condition for a modal formula P is a
formula F (first or higher-order) in the language {R, {Sx}x∈W} so that F |= F
(as a relational structure) if and only if ∀valuationV 〈F , V 〉 |= P.
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It is easy to establish that the frame condition for P is xRyRzSxu→ zSyu
where xRyRzSxu is short for xRy ∧ yRz ∧ zSxu. Likewise, it is elementary to
see that the frame condition for M is given by ySxzRu→ yRu. In this paper we
shall compute the frame conditions for two new series of principles in IL(All).
Often we shall denote a valuation V directly by the induced forcing relation
. Given a Veltman model 〈F ,〉 we define a C-assuring successor –denoted
by RC

– as follows
xRC

y :=
(
xRy ∧ y  C ∧ ∀z (ySxz → z  C)
)
.
3 A slim hierarchy of principles
In this section we present a hierarchy of interpretability principles in IL(All) of
growing strength. For a well-behaved sub-hierarchy we shall compute the frame
conditions and prove arithmetical soundness. There is no particular ‘slimness’
inherent to the hierarchy presented here. The main reason for our name is that
we tend to depict the frame conditions (see Figure 1) in a slim way as opposed
to the depicted frame conditions for the series of principles that we refer to as
a broad series of principles (see Figure 2).
3.1 A slim hierarchy
Inductively, we define a series of principles as follows.
R0 := A0 ⊲B0 → ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)⊲B0 ∧C0
R2n+1 := R2n[¬(An ⊲ ¬Cn)/¬(An ⊲ ¬Cn) ∧ (En+1 ⊲ ♦An+1);
Bn ∧Cn/Bn ∧Cn ∧ (En+1 ⊲An+1)]
R2n+2 := R2n+1[Bn/Bn ∧ (An+1 ⊲Bn+1);
♦An+1/¬(An+1 ⊲ ¬Cn+1);
(En+1 ⊲An+1)/(En+1 ⊲An+1) ∧ (En+1 ⊲Bn+1 ∧Cn+1)]
As to illustrate how these substitutions work we shall calculate the first five
principles.
R0 := A0 ⊲B0 → ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)⊲B0 ∧C0
R1 := A0 ⊲B0 → ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ♦A1)⊲B0 ∧C0 ∧ (E1 ⊲A1)
R2 := A0 ⊲B0 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1)→ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1)) ⊲
B0 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1) ∧C0 ∧ (E1 ⊲A1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ B1 ∧C1)
R3 := A0 ⊲B0 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1)→
¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E2 ⊲ ♦A2)) ⊲
B0 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1) ∧C0 ∧ (E1 ⊲A1) ∧ (E1 ⊲B1 ∧C1 ∧ (E2 ⊲A2))
R4 := A0 ⊲B0 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A2 ⊲B2))→
¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E2 ⊲ ¬(A2 ⊲ ¬C2))) ⊲
B0 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A2 ⊲B2)) ∧C0 ∧ (E1 ⊲A1) ∧(
E1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A2 ⊲B2) ∧C1 ∧ (E2 ⊲A2) ∧ (E2 ⊲B2 ∧C2)
)
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It is easy to see that the hierarchy defines a series of principles of increasing
strength as expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For each natural number n we have that ILRn+1 ⊢ Rn.
Proof. By an easy case distinction. We see that ⊢IL R2n+1 → R2n by choosing
En+1 := ♦⊤ and An+1 := ⊤. To see that ⊢IL R2n+2 → R2n+1 we choose
Cn+1 := ⊤ and Bn+1 := An+1.
Thus, to understand the hierarchy well, it suffices to study a well-behaved
co-final subsequence of it. To this end we define the following hierarchy.
For any n ≥ 0 we define schemata Xn, Yn and Zn as follows.
X0 = A0 ⊲B0;
Y0 = ¬(A0 ⊲ C0);
Z0 = B0 ∧C0;
Xn+1 = An+1 ⊲Bn+1 ∧ (Xn);
Yn+1 = ¬(An+1 ⊲ ¬Cn+1) ∧ (En+1 ⊲ Yn);
Zn+1 = Bn+1 ∧ (Xn) ∧Cn+1 ∧ (En+1 ⊲An) ∧ (En+1 ⊲ Zn).
For any n ≥ 0 define
R˜n = Xn → Yn ⊲ Zn.
To see how this proceeds, let us evaluate the first couple of instances:
R˜0 := A0 ⊲B0 → ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)⊲B0 ∧C0;
R˜1 := A1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲ B0)→
¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)) ⊲
B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0) ∧C1 ∧ (E1 ⊲A0) ∧ (E1 ⊲B0 ∧C0);
R˜2 := A2 ⊲B2 ∧ (A1 ⊲ B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0))→
¬(A2 ⊲ ¬C2) ∧
(
E2 ⊲ ¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0))
)
⊲
B2 ∧ (A1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0)) ∧C2 ∧ (E2 ⊲A1) ∧(
E2 ⊲B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0) ∧C1 ∧ (E1 ⊲A0) ∧ (E1 ⊲B0 ∧C0)
)
;
It is clear that the R˜k hierarchy is directly related to the Rk hierarchy:
Lemma 3.2. For each natural number k we have R2k := R˜k[Xi/Xk−i; Ei/Ek+1−i],
where X ∈ {A,B,C}.
Proof. By visual inspection we see that it holds for k = 0, 1. It is proven in full
generality by an easy induction. To prove the lemma, it is best to consider the
place-holders like Ai etc. as propositional variables since otherwise in principle,
for example, Ai could contain Ei as a subformula.
For the remainder of this section, we shall focus on the R˜k hierarchy and
begin by computing a collection of frame condititions.
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3.2 Frame conditions
For any n ≥ 0 we define a ternary relation Gn(x, y, z) on Veltman-frames as
follows.
G0(x, y, z) = ∀u (zRu⇒ ySxu),
Gn+1(x, y, z) = ∀u
(
zRu⇒ ySxu ∧ ∀v (uSxv ⇒ Gn(z, u, v)
)
.
For every n ≥ 0 we define the first-order frame condition Fn as follows.
Fn = ∀w, x, y, z (wRxRySwz ⇒ Gn(x, y, z)).
The main result of this subsection is that F2n is the frame correspondence of
R˜n. For n = 0 this has been established in [4]. It is easy to see that Gn+1(x, y, z)
implies Gn(x, y, z) so that Fn+1 also implies Fn. The frame conditions Fk are
depicted in Figure 1 for the first three values of k.
w
x0
y0 x1
y1
Sw
Sx0
w
x0
y0 x1
y1x2
y2
Sw
Sx0
Sx0
Sx1
w
x0
y0 x1
y1x2
y2 x3
y3
Sw
Sx0
Sx0
Sx1
Sx1
Sx2
Figure 1: From left to right we have depicted F0 to F2. Since Fk+1 implies Fk
we have only depicted the content of Fk+1 which is new w.r.t. Fk. As such we
should read the pictures as: “if all un-dashed relations are as in the picture,
then also the dashed relation should be present”.
In what follows we let F = 〈W,R, S〉 be an arbitrary Veltman-frame. With
a forcing relation  we will always mean a forcing relation on F . For our
convenience we define
A−1 ≡ X−1 ≡ Z−1 ≡ ⊤.
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Before we can prove a frame correspondence we first need a technical lemma.
Lemma 3.3. For all k ≥ 0 and all x, y, z ∈ W . If G2k(x, y, z) then for any
forcing relation  for which
x  Yk and xR
Ck

y and z  Xk−1,
we also have
z  Ck ∧ (Ek ⊲Ak−1) ∧ (Ek ⊲ Zk−1).
Proof. We shall write xRCky as short for xRCk

y and prove the claim by induc-
tion on k. With the convention that A−1 ≡ Z−1 ≡ ⊤ the lemma is trivial for
k = 0. So assume k > 0. Let  be a forcing relation and take x, y and z such
that
x  ¬(Ak ⊲ ¬Ck) ∧ (Ek ⊲ Yk−1), (4)
xRCky, (5)
z  Xk−1, (6)
G2k(x, y, z). (7)
Take an arbitrary u ∈ W with zRu. By (7) we have ySxu and thus by (5) we
have u  Ck. This shows z  Ck.
To show that also the other two conjuncts hold at z assume that u  Ek.
By (4) we find some v with uSxv and
v  Yk−1. (8)
In order to show z  Ek ⊲ Ak−1 we have to find some a with uSza  Ak−1.
Remark that Yk−1 implies ♦Ak−1 thus there exists some a with vRa  Ak−1.
By (7) we have G2k−1(z, u, v) and thus uSza.
In order to show that also z  Ek ⊲ Zk−1 we have to find some b with
uSzb  Zk−1. We just used that Yk−1 implies ♦Ak−1, but remark that Yk−1
implies the stronger statement that ¬(Ak−1 ⊲ ¬Ck−1). Thus there exists some
a with a  Ak−1 and
vRCk−1a. (9)
As above, by (7) we have G2k−1(z, u, v) and thus uSza and zRa. By (6) there
exists a b with aSzb and
b  Bk−1 ∧ (Xk−2). (10)
Since uSza whence also uSzb holds, we will be done if we show that b  Zk−1.
To show that the remaining conjuncts of Zk−1 hold at b (that is b  Ck−1 ∧
(Ek−1 ⊲Ak−2)∧ (Ek−1 ⊲Zk−2)) simply observe that G2k−2(v, a, b) and use (8),
(9) and (10) to invoke the (IH) on v, a and b.
Corollary 3.4. If F |= F2k, then F |= R˜k.
12
Proof. Fix a forcing relation  and let w, x ∈ W such that w  Xk and wRx 
Yk. Then for some y we have xR
Cky  Ak. Thus there exists z with ySwz and
z  Bk ∧ (Xk−1) (11)
(recall X−1 ≡ ⊤). Since F |= F2k we have G2k(x, y, z). Thus by Lemma 3.3 we
get
z  Ck ∧ (Ek ⊲ Ak−1) ∧ (Ek ⊲ Zk−1) . (12)
Combining (11) and (12) gives z  Zk.
The reversal of this corollary is again preceded by a technical lemma. We
shall denote by ak, bk, ck, and ek, propositional variables that shall play the
role of the Ak, Bk, Ck and Ek respectively in the principles R˜n. Likewise, by
Xk we shall denote the formula that arises by substituting aj for Aj in Xk and
bj for Bj . The formulas Yk and Zk are defined similarly.
Lemma 3.5. For any k ≥ 0 and all x, y, z ∈ W . If for all forcing relations 
for which
x  Yk and xR
ck

y and z  Xk−1
we also have
z  ck ∧ (ek ⊲ ak−1) ∧ (ek ⊲ Zk−1),
then G2k(x, y, z).
Proof. Induction on k. Let x, y, z ∈W and assume the conditions of the lemma.
Unfolding the definition of G2k(x, y, z) shows us that we have to show that
1. for all u with zRu we have ySxu (k ≥ 0);
2. and for all v and a with uSxv and vRa we have uSza (k > 0);
3. and for all b with aSzb we have G2(k−1)(v, a, b) (k > 0).
We will show 1 and 2 ‘by hand’ and invoke the (IH) for 3. In each of the three
cases we will choose similar but different forcing relations .
We first show 1. So let zRu. Define
w  ck ⇔ ySxw and w  ak ⇔ w = y.
And let all the other variables be false everywhere. Then xRck

y and x 
¬(ak ⊲ ¬ck). Since none of the ei nor aj with j 6= k holds anywhere in the
model, we trivially have x  Yk and z  Xk−1 and thus according to the
conditions of the lemma in particular z  ck. By definition of  we thus have
ySxu which proves 1. Note that for k = 0 we only have to look after 1 hence
we have now dealt with the base case of our induction.
Now we continue to show 2 assuming k > 0. Choose any v and a with uSxv
and vRa. As above define
w  ck ⇔ ySxw and w  ak ⇔ w = y.
13
We now also define
w  ek ⇔ w = u and,
w  ak−1 ⇔ w = a⇔ w  bk−1 and,
w  ck−1 ⇔ aSzw.
Let all the other propositional variables be false everywhere. Now v  Yk−1
and thus x  Yk. It is not hard to see that we also have z  Xk−1 and thus
according to the condition of the lemma we have in particular z  ek ⊲ ak−1.
Since zRu  ek there must be an a
′ with uSza
′  ak−1. Since a is the only
world that forces ak−1 we must have uSza.
To finish and show 3 choose b such that aSzb. We want to show that
G2(k−1)(v, a, b). Invoking the (IH) it is enough to show that for any forcing
relation  for which
v  Yk−1, and vR
ck−1

a and b  Xk−2, (13)
we also have
b  (ek−1 ⊲ ak−2) ∧ (ek−1 ⊲ Zk−2) ∧ck−1. (14)
Our strategy in proving this is as follows. We slightly tweak  to obtain ′.
This ′ is similar to  in that (13) still holds and moreover
b  A⇔ b ′ A for subformulas A of (ek−1 ⊲ ak−2) ∧ (ek−1 ⊲ Zk−2) ∧ck−1.
(15)
However, it is (possibly) different in that we now know that x ′ Yk, and xR
ck
′
y
and, z ′ Xk−1 so that we may apply the main assumption of the lemma to
′ concluding z ′ ck ∧ (ek ⊲ ak−1) ∧ (ek ⊲ Zk−1). The latter will help us
conclude (14).
Thus we consider an arbitrary forcing relation  that satisfies (13). We
modify  to obtain ′ such that it satisfies
w ′ ak ⇔ w = y;
w ′ ek ⇔ w = u;
w ′ ck ⇔ ySxw;
w ′ ak−1 ⇔ w = a;
w ′ bk−1 ⇔ w = b.
Apart from these modifications, ′ will coincide with . It is a straightforward
check to see that we have (13) for ′ and that moreover (15) holds. In addition,
by the definition of ′ we now also have
x ′ Yk and xR
ck
′
y and z ′ Xk−1. (16)
Thus, we see that ′ satisfies the antecedent of the condition of the lemma.
Consequently, we have z ′ ek ⊲ Zk−1. Since zRu 
′ ek, there must exist some
b′ with uSzb
′ ′ Zk−1. But now, since bk−1 is a conjunct of Zk−1 and b is
the only world that ′-forces bk−1, we must have b 
′ Zk−1. In particular, we
conclude b ′ (ek−1 ⊲ ak−2) ∧ (ek−1 ⊲ Zk−2) ∧ ck−1; by (15) the same holds
for  and we are done.
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Putting this all together gives us the frame correspondence for R˜k.
Theorem 3.6. For any Veltman frame F and any natural number k ≥ 0 we
have
F |= F2k ⇐⇒ F |= R˜k ⇐⇒ F |= R2k.
Proof. The second equivalence is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.2 so we focus
on the first equivalence.
The ⇒ direction is just Corollary 3.4. For the other direction, fix some k,
assume that F |= R˜k and let wRxRySwz. We have to show that G2k(x, y, z).
Now consider any forcing relation  that satisfies xRck

y, and x  Yk and,
z  Xk−1. By Lemma 3.5 it is enough to show that
z  ck ∧ (ek ⊲ ak−1) ∧ (ek ⊲ Zk−1). (17)
Now consider a forcing relation ′ where ′ is like  except that
v ′ ak ⇔ v = y and v 
′ bk ⇔ v = z.
Notice that xRck
′
y and thus also x ′ Yk. But now we have w 
′ Xk as well
and thus w ′ Yk ⊲ Zk. Thus there must be some z
′ with xSwz
′  Zk. Since
bk is a conjunct of Zk and z is the only world where bk is forced we must have
z ′ Zk. Since ck ∧ (ek ⊲ ak−1) ∧ (ek ⊲ Zk−1) does not involve ak nor bk we
have (17).
3.3 Arithmetical soundness
Via a series of lemmata we shall prove Theorem 3.7 to the effect that the hier-
archy {Ri}i∈ω is arithmetically sound in any reasonable arithmetical theory.
Theorem 3.7. Each of the Ri is arithmetically sound in any theory extending
S12.
It is sufficient to prove that each of the R2m is arithmetically sound in any
reasonable arithmetical theory whence we shall focus on the principles R˜i. We
shall first exhibit a soundness proof of R˜1 and then indicate how this is general-
ized to the rest of the hierarchy. And before proving R˜1 we need some auxiliary
lemmas.
Lemma 3.8. Let T be any theory extending S12. We have that for any arith-
metical sentences E1, A0, B0 and C0 that
T ⊢ E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)→ ∃
CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙(A0 ∧
K˙C0)
)
.
Proof. Reason in T and assume E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0). Note that by Lemma 2.6
we have E1⊲∀
CutK♦(A0 ∧
K˙C0). Consequently, by Pudla´k’s Lemma, Lemma
2.2, we get ∃J
(
E1 ∧∃
CutK∈J˙ J˙¬(A0 ∧
K˙C0)⊲⊥
)
. But this is provably the
same as ∃CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙(A0 ∧
K˙C0)
)
as was to be shown.
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Lemma 3.9. Let T be any theory extending S12. We have that for any arith-
metical sentences E1, A0, B0 and C0 that
T ⊢ ∃CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0 ∧
K˙C0)
)
→ E1 ⊲A0.
Proof. Reason in T . From the assumption we get in particular that ∃CutJ 
(
E1 →
♦J˙A0
)
so that ∃CutJ E1 ⊲ ♦
J˙A0 ⊲A0.
Lemma 3.10. Let T be any theory extending S12. We have that for any arith-
metical sentences E1, A0, B0 and C0 that
T ⊢ (A0 ⊲B0) ∧ ∃
CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0 ∧
K˙C0)
)
→ E1 ⊲B0 ∧C0.
Proof. Reasoning in T we get from ∃CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙(A0 ∧
K˙C0)
)
that ∀CutK
(
E1 ⊲A0 ∧
K˙C0
)
. We combine this with A0 ⊲B0 → ∃
CutJ
(
A0 ∧
J˙C0 ⊲B0 ∧C0
)
to conclude E1 ⊲B0 ∧C0.
With these technical lemmas we can prove soundness of R˜1.
Lemma 3.11. Let T be any theory extending S12. We have that for any arith-
metical sentences E1, A1, B1, A0, B0 and C0 that
T ⊢ A1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0)→
¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)) ⊲
B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0) ∧C1 ∧ (E1 ⊲A0) ∧ (E1 ⊲B0 ∧C0).
Proof. We reason in T . Using our new technical lemma and Lemma 2.6 we get
¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)) →
∀CutK♦(A1 ∧
K˙C1) ∧ ∃
CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
Cut L∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0 ∧
L˙C0)
)
→
∀CutK♦
(
A1 ∧K˙C1 ∧ ∃
Cut J∈K˙ K˙
(
E1 → ∀
Cut L∈J˙ ♦J˙(A0 ∧L˙C0)
))
.
The last step is due to the principle of outside-big inside-small (Lemma ??) and
allows us to conclude
∀CutK
(
¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)) ⊲
A1 ∧
K˙C1 ∧ ∃
Cut J∈K˙ K˙
(
E1 → ∀
Cut L∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0 ∧
L˙C0)
) )
.
This can be combined with the fact that
A1 ⊲B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0)→ ∃
CutK
(
A1 ∧ σ
K˙ ⊲B1 ∧ σ ∧ (A0 ⊲B0)
)
for this particular K holds for any σ ∈ Σ1 to conclude
A1 ⊲B1∧(A0 ⊲B0)→ ¬(A1 ⊲ ¬C1) ∧ (E1 ⊲ ¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0)) ⊲
B1 ∧ (A0 ⊲B0) ∧C1 ∧ ∃
CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
Cut L∈J˙ ♦J˙(A0 ∧
L˙C0)
)
.
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(Note that K˙C1 ∧ ∃
Cut J∈K˙ K˙
(
E1 → ∀
Cut L∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0∧
L˙C0)
)
is equivalent
to an ∃Σb1 sentence relativized to K˙.) Our technical lemmas 3.9 and 3.10 tell us
that
(A0 ⊲B0) ∧ ∃
CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
Cut L∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0 ∧
L˙C0)
)
→
(E1 ⊲A0) ∧ (E1 ⊲B0 ∧C0)
and we are done.
The soundness proofs for R˜k is essentially not much different. We shall
indicate where the soundness proof for R˜1 needs to be modified and begin with
modifications of the technical lemmas.
However, first we must inductively define a series of important formulas. In
our definition we work with more variables than actually needed. However, we
have chosen to do so since our variables can be interpreted as numbers or as
formulas and we wish to avoid expressions like ∀CutJ  ∃J∈J˙ φ.
H1 := ∃
CutJ1 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK1∈J˙1 ♦
J˙1(A0 ∧
K˙1C0)
)
;
Hk+1 := ∃
CutJk+1 
(
Ek+1 → ∀
CutKk+1∈J˙k+1 ♦
J˙k+1(Ak ∧
K˙k+1Ck ∧H
K˙k+1
k )
)
.
It is easy to see that for each k > 0 the formula Hk is an ∃Σ
b
1 formula. The
next lemmas show us that Hk+1 are ∃Σ
b
1 consequences of the Σ3 statements
Ek+1 ⊲ Yk which contain all the essential information for proving soundness.
First we prove a simple modification of Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 3.12. Let T be any theory extending S1
2
. We have that for any arith-
metical sentences E1, A0, B0 and C0 and for any ∃Σ
b
1 formula σ that
T ⊢ E1 ⊲¬(A0 ⊲¬C0)∧ σ → ∃
CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0 ∧
K˙C0 ∧ σ
K˙)
)
.
Proof. We repeat the proof of Lemma 3.8. Note that, by our reading conventions
the antecedent E1⊲¬(A0⊲¬C0)∧σ should be read as E1⊲
(
¬(A0⊲¬C0)∧σ
)
.
We reason in T and see that
¬(A0 ⊲ ¬C0) ∧ σ → ∀
CutK♦(A0 ∧
K˙C0) ∧ σ
→ ∀CutK♦(A0 ∧K˙C0 ∧ σK˙).
As before, the latter implies ∃CutJ 
(
E1 → ∀
CutK∈J˙ ♦J˙ (A0∧
K˙C0∧σ
K˙)
)
.
With this lemma we see that the Hk+1 are an ∃Σ
b
1 encoding of information
present in Ek+1 ⊲ Yk:
Lemma 3.13. Let T be a theory containing S1
2
and let the formulas Ei, Ai, and
Ci be arbitrary. For any number k we have that
T ⊢ Ek+1 ⊲ Yk → Hk+1.
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Proof. By an external induction on k. For k = 0 this is simply Lemma 3.8.
For the inductive case we reason in T and see that Ek+2 ⊲ Yk+1 ≡ Ek+2 ⊲
¬(Ak+1 ⊲ ¬Ck+1) ∧ (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk). By the inductive hypothesis we have that
Ek+1 ⊲ Yk → Hk+1 so that Ek+2 ⊲ Yk+1 → Ek+2 ⊲ ¬(Ak+1 ⊲ ¬Ck+1) ∧Hk+1.
Since Hk+1 is equivalent to an ∃Σ
b
1 formula, by Lemma 3.12 we see that
Ek+2 ⊲ ¬(Ak+1 ⊲ ¬Ck+1) ∧Hk+1 → Hk+2
as was to be shown.
Moreover, theHk+1 formulas contain all the information to get the induction
going as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.14. Let T be a theory containing S12 and let the formulas Ei, Ai, Bi,
and Ci be arbitrary. For any number k we have that
T ⊢ (Xk) ∧ Hk+1 → Ek+1 ⊲ Zk.
Proof. By induction on k where the case k = 0 is just lemma 3.10. For the
inductive case, we reason in T and assume (Xk+1) ∧ Hk+2.
From the definition of Hk+2 we get
∃CutJk+2 
(
Ek+2 → ∀
CutKk+2∈J˙k+2 ♦
J˙k+2(Ak+1 ∧
K˙k+2Ck+1 ∧H
K˙k+2
k+1 )
)
so that ∃CutJk+2 ∀
CutKk+2 
(
Ek+2 → ♦
J˙k+2(Ak+1 ∧
K˙k+2Ck+1 ∧H
K˙k+2
k+1 )
)
whence
∀CutKk+2
(
Ek+2 ⊲Ak+1 ∧
K˙k+2Ck+1 ∧H
K˙k+2
k+1
)
. (18)
From Xk+1 –which is by definition equal to Ak+1⊲Bk+1 ∧ (Xk)– we find via
Pudla´k’s lemma, Lemma 2.2, a specific cut Kk+2 such that for any formula σ
in Σ1 we obtain Ak+1 ∧σ
Kk+2 ⊲Bk+1 ∧ (Xk)∧σ. We can plug in this cut Kk+2
to (18) to obtain via transitivity of ⊲ that
Ek+2 ⊲Bk+1 ∧ (Xk) ∧Ck+1 ∧Hk+1.
We are almost done but Bk+1 ∧ (Xk)∧Ck+1 ∧Hk+1 is not quite equal to Zk+1
as was needed. The missing conjuncts are Ek+1 ⊲Ak and Ek+1 ⊲ Zk. The first
is easily seen to follow from Hk+1 and the second follows from the inductive
hypothesis applied to (Xk) ∧Hk+1.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.7 that the whole hierarchy is arith-
metically sound.
Theorem 3.15. Let T be a theory containing S12 and let Ai, Bi, Ci and Ei be
arbitrary arithmetical formulas. We have for each number k that
T ⊢ R˜k id est T ⊢ Xk → Yk ⊲ Zk.
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Proof. By an external induction on k where the base case is the soundness of R˜0
which has been proven in [4]. Thus, we reason in T assuming Ak+1⊲Bk+1∧(Xk).
We need to conclude that Yk+1 ⊲ Zk+1. But Yk+1 is nothing but ¬(Ak+1 ⊲
¬Ck+1) ∧ (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk). By Lemma 3.13 we know that (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk) → Hk+1.
Using this and reasoning as before we obtain
¬(Ak+1 ⊲ ¬Ck+1) ∧ (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk) → ∀
CutK♦(Ak+1 ∧
K˙Ck+1) ∧ (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk)
→ ∀CutK♦(Ak+1 ∧
K˙Ck+1) ∧Hk+1
→ ∀CutK♦(Ak+1 ∧
K˙Ck+1 ∧H
K˙
k+1).
Consequently,
∀CutK
(
¬(Ak+1 ⊲ ¬Ck+1) ∧ (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk)⊲Ak+1 ∧
K˙Ck+1 ∧H
K˙
k+1
)
.
This can be combined with Pudla´k’s Lemma on Ak+1 ⊲Bk+1 ∧ (Xk) to obtain
¬(Ak+1 ⊲ ¬Ck+1) ∧ (Ek+1 ⊲ Yk)⊲Bk+1 ∧ (Xk) ∧Ck+1 ∧Hk+1.
It is easy to see that Hk+1 implies Ek+1 ⊲ Ak. Moreover, Lemma 3.14 tells us
that (Xk) ∧Hk+1 → Ek+1 ⊲ Zk so that we may conclude
¬(Ak+1⊲¬Ck+1)∧(Ek+1⊲Yk)⊲Bk+1∧(Xk)∧Ck+1∧(Ek+1⊲Ak)∧(Ek+1⊲Zk)
as was to be shown.
4 A broad series of principles
In this section we present a different series of principles. We refer to this se-
ries as the broad series since the frame-conditions –see Figure 2– are typically
represented over a broader area than the slim hierarchy as discussed above.
4.1 A broad series
In order to define the second series we first define a series of auxiliary formulas.
For any n ≥ 1 we define the schemata Un as follows.
U1 := ♦¬(D1 ⊲ ¬C),
Un+2 := ♦((Dn+1 ⊲Dn+2) ∧ Un+1).
Now, for n ≥ 0 we define the schemata Rn as follows.
R0 := A⊲B → ¬(A ⊲ ¬C)⊲B ∧C,
Rn+1 := A⊲B → Un+1 ∧ (Dn+1 ⊲A)⊲ B ∧C.
As an illustration we shall calculate the first four principles.
R0 := A⊲B → ¬(A⊲ ¬C) ⊲B ∧C
R1 := A⊲B → ♦¬(D1 ⊲ ¬C) ∧ (D1 ⊲A)⊲B ∧C
R2 := A⊲B → ♦
[
(D1 ⊲D2) ∧ ♦¬(D1 ⊲ ¬C)
]
∧ (D2 ⊲A)⊲B ∧C
R3 := A⊲B → ♦
(
(D2 ⊲D3) ∧ ♦
[
(D1 ⊲D2) ∧ ♦¬(D1 ⊲ ¬C)
])
∧ (D3 ⊲A)
⊲B ∧C
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While the series Ri did define a hierarchy in that Ri+1 ⊢ Ri, we shall see that
no such relation holds for the series Ri.
4.2 Frame conditions
It is not hard to determine the frame condition for the first couple of principles
in this series and in Figure 2 we have depicted the first three frame-conditions.
In this section we shall prove that the correspondence proceeds as expected.
Informally, the frame condition for Rn shall be the universal closure of
xn+1Rxn . . . Rx0Ry0Sx1y1 . . . SxnynSxn+1yn+1Ru→ y0Sx0u. (19)
x1
x0
y0 y1
z
Sx1
Sx0
x2
x1
x0
y0 y1 y2
z
Sx1 Sx2
Sx0
x3
x2
x1
x0
y0 y1 y2 y3
z
Sx1 Sx2 Sx3
Sx0
Figure 2: From left to right, this figure depicts the frame conditions F0 through
F2 corresponding to R0 through R2. The reading convention is as always: if
all the un-dashed relations are present as in the picture, then also the dashed
relation should be there.
In order to make this frame condition precise and prove it, we shall first
recast it in a recursive fashion. In writing (19) recursively we shall use those
variables that will emphasize the relation with (19). Of course, free variables
can be renamed at the readers liking.
First, we start by introducing a relation Bn that captures the antecedent
of (19). Note that this antecedent says that first there is a chain of points xi
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related by R, followed by a chain of points yi related by different S relations.
The relation Bn will be applied to the end-points of both chains where the
condition on the intermediate points is imposed by recursion.
B0(x1, x0, y0, y1) := x1Rx1Ry0Sx1y1,
Bn+1(xn+2, x0, y0, yn+2) := ∃xn+1, yn+1
(
xn+2Rxn+1 ∧ Bn(xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1)
∧ yn+1Sxn+2yn+2
)
.
For every n ≥ 0 we can now define the first order frame condition Fn as follows.
Fn := ∀xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1
(
Bn(xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1)⇒ ∀u (yn+1Ru⇒ y0Sx0u)
)
.
Sometimes we shall write xn+1Bn[x0, y0] yn+1 conceiving the quaternary re-
lation Bn as a binary relation indexed by the pair x0, y0. In what follows we let
F = 〈W,R, S〉 be an arbitrary Veltman-frame. The next lemma follows from an
easy induction on n.
Lemma 4.1. For each number n we have that Bn[x0, y0] ⊆ R, that is, if
xn+1Bn[x0, y0] yn+1, then xn+1Ryn+1.
To prove that F |= Fn implies F |= Rn we first need a technical lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let w ∈ W and  be a forcing relation on F . If
xk+1  Uk+1 ∧ (Dk+1 ⊲A),
then there exist x0, y0 and yk+1 such that Bk(xk+1, x0, y0, yk+1), x0R
C

y0 and
yk+1  A.
Proof. Induction on k. If k = 0 then Uk+1 = ♦¬(D1 ⊲ ¬C) and the statement
is easily checked. For the inductive case, we assume
xk+2  Uk+2 ∧ (Dk+2 ⊲A).
Recall that Uk+2 := ♦((Dk+1 ⊲ Dk+2) ∧ Uk+1). Thus, there exists some xk+1
with xk+2Rxk+1 and
xk+1  (Dk+1 ⊲Dk+2) ∧ Uk+1.
Applying the (IH) (with Dk+2 substituted for A) we find x0, y0 and yk+1 with
Bk(xk+1, x0, y0, yk+1), x0R
C

y0 and yk+1  Dk+2. As Bk(xk+1, x0, y0, yk+1) we
get xk+1Ryk+1 (Lemma 4.1). Since we had xk+2Rxk+1 we see that xk+2Ryk+1 
Dk+2, and since xk+2  Dk+2 ⊲A, we find some yk+2 with yk+1Sxk+2yk+2 and
yk+2  A. By definition of Bk+1 we have Bk+1(xk+2, x0, y0, yk+2).
Corollary 4.3. If F |= Fn then F |= Rn.
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Proof. Induction on n. For n = 0 this is known (see [4]), so we assume n >
0. Let  be a forcing relation, let xn+1, xn ∈ W and assume xn+1  A ⊲
B, xn+1Rxn and xn  Un ∧ (Dn ⊲ A). By Lemma 4.2 we find x0, y0 and
yn such that Bn−1(xn, x0, y0, yn), with x0R
C

y0 and yn  A. We have that
Bn−1(xn, x0, y0, yn) implies xnRyn (Lemma 4.1) and thus since xn+1Rxn we
also we have xn+1Ryn  A. By assumption xn+1 ⊢ A⊲B so that for some yn+1
we have ynSxn+1yn+1  B. Clearly, we also have xnSxn+1yn+1 so that we are
done if we have shown that yn+1  C. To this extent, we choose some u with
yn+1Ru. Since we have that Bn(xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1), by F
n we have also y0Sx0u.
But x0R
C

y0 and thus we have u  C, as required.
To prove the converse implication, we start again with a technical lemma.
As before we shall denote by a, b, c, and dk, propositional variables that shall
play the role of the A, B, C and Dk respectively in the principles R
n. Let Uk
denote the formula that arises by simultaneously substituting c for C and dk
for Dk in Uk.
Lemma 4.4. Let {a, c,d1, . . . ,dk+1} be a collection of distinct propositional
variables. If F |= Bk(xk+1, x0, y0, yk+1), then there exists a forcing relation 
on F such that
1. xk+1  Uk+1 ∧ (dk+1 ⊲ a);
2. x  c iff y0Sx0x;
3. x  a⇔ x = yk+1;
4. x 1 p for any p /∈ {d1, . . . ,dk+1, c,a}.
Proof. The idea is very simple using the informal description of Bk being the
antecedent of (19). We define a valuation  so that di+1 is only true at yi and
a is only true at yk+1. Moreover, we define x  c iff y0Sx0x and x 1 p for any
p /∈ {d1, . . . ,dk+1, c,a}. It is not hard to see that xk+1  Uk+1 ∧ (dk+1 ⊲ a)
for this valuation .
To make the argument precise, we proceed by induction on k. If k = 0 then
Bk(x1, x0, y0, y1) simply means x1Rx0Ry0Sx1y1 and we define
x  a⇔ x = y1, x  c⇔ y0Sx0x and, x  d1 ⇔ x = y0.
The lemma is easily checked if we further define x 1 p for any p /∈ {d1, c,a}.
For the inductive case we consider k > 0. Then Bk(xk+1, x0, y0, yk+1) implies
that there are xk and yk such that
xk+1Rxk Bk−1[x0, y0] yk Sxk+1 yk+1.
The (IH) (with dk+1 substituted for a) gives a forcing relation  such that
xk  Uk ∧ (dk ⊲ dk+1), x0R
c

y0, x  dk+1 ⇔ x = yk
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and x 1 p for p /∈ {d1, . . . ,dk+1, c}. So we have xk+1  ♦
(
Uk ∧ (dk ⊲ dk+1)
)
;
in other words xk+1  Uk+1. We now define 
′ as follows
x ′ a⇔ x = yk+1 and x 
′ p⇔ x  p for p 6= a.
Clearly, the properties xk  Uk∧ (dk⊲dk+1), aR
c

b, x  dk+1 ⇔ x = yk simply
extend to ′ and likewise we have that x 1′ p for any p /∈ {d1, . . . ,dk+1, c,a}.
Moreover, we now have xk+1 
′ dk+1 ⊲ a as well.
As a corollary to this lemma, we can now obtain the full the frame conditions
for the principles Rn.
Theorem 4.5. For each number n we have F |= Fn iff F |= Rn.
Proof. The ⇒ direction is just Corollary 4.3 so we focus on the other direction.
Thus, we suppose that F |= Rn, consider any xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1 ∈ W with
Bn(xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1) and set out to show that for any u with yn+1Ru we have
y0Sx0u. We now apply Lemma 4.4 and simultaneously substitute a for dn+1
and b for a to see that there exists a forcing relation  such that
xn+1  Un+1[dn+1/a] ∧ (a ⊲ b), x  c⇔ y0Sx0x and x  b⇔ x = yn+1.
Since n = 0 is known, we assume n > 0. Thus, we find xn with xn+1Rxn and
xn  Un−1 ∧ dn ⊲ a (note that Un−1[dn+1/a] = Un−1). Using F |= R
n
we see
that there must exist some x with x  b ∧c. But yn+1 is the only world that
forces b thus necessarily yn+1  c. By the choice of  we thus have that if
yn+1Ru then y0Sx0u.
Using the frame condition we readily see that the broad series of principles
does not define a hierarchy.
Corollary 4.6. For n 6= m we have ILRn 0 ILRm.
Proof. For each m 6= n it is easy to exhibit a frame F so that F |= Fn but
F 6|= Fm.
4.3 Arithmetical soundness
We will now see that all the principles Rn are arithmetically sound and begin
with a simple lemma.
Lemma 4.7. For any theory T extending S12 and any natural number n > 0,
we have that
T ⊢ Un → ∀
CutK ♦(Dn ∧
K˙C).
Proof. We proceed by induction on n and first consider n = 1. Thus, we reason
in T and assume U1, that is, ♦¬(D1⊲¬C). We conclude ♦∀
CutK ♦(D1∧
K˙C),
whence ∀CutK ♦♦(D1∧
K˙C) and also ∀CutK ♦(D1∧
K˙C) as was to be shown.
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Next, we consider the inductive case, again reasoning in T and assuming
Un+1 which is ♦
(
(Dn ⊲Dn+1) ∧ Un
)
. By the (IH) we conclude from Un that
∀CutJ ♦ (Dn ∧
J˙C). (20)
By Lemma 2.8 we obtain from Dn ⊲Dn+1 that
∀CutK ∃CutJ Dn ∧
J˙C ⊲Dn+1 ∧
K˙C. (21)
Combining Dn ∧ J˙C ⊲Dn+1 ∧ K˙C →
(
♦(Dn ∧ J˙C) → ♦(Dn+1 ∧ K˙C)
)
with (20) and (21) under a ♦ we conclude that
♦
(
(Dn ⊲Dn+1) ∧ Un
)
→ ♦
(
∀CutK ♦ (Dn+1 ∧
K˙C)
)
→ ∀CutK ♦
(
♦ (Dn+1 ∧
K˙C)
)
→ ∀CutK ♦ (Dn+1 ∧
K˙C)
as was to be shown.
With this lemma, we can now prove the soundness of the series Rn.
Theorem 4.8. For each natural number n we have that Rn is arithmetically
sound in any theory T extending S1
2
.
Proof. Since we already know that R0 is sound, we consider n > 0. We reason
in T , assume A⊲B and set out to prove Un ∧ (Dn⊲A)⊲B∧C. By Pudla´k’s
Lemma we get
∃CutJ A ∧JC ⊲B ∧C. (22)
On the other hand, by the generalization of Pudla´k’s Lemma (Lemma 2.8)
applied to Dn ⊲ A we obtain that ∀
CutJ ∃CutK Dn ∧ 
K˙C ⊲ A ∧ J˙C so that
∀CutJ ∃CutK
(
♦(Dn ∧ 
K˙C) → ♦(A ∧ J˙C)
)
. By Lemma 4.7 we see that
Un → ∀
CutK♦(A ∧ K˙C). Combining these last two observations, we see that
Un ∧ (Dn ⊲A)→ ∀
CutJ ♦ (A ∧J˙C) so that ∀CutJ Un ∧ (Dn ⊲A)⊲A ∧
J˙C.
Combining this with (22) yields Un∧(Dn⊲A)⊲B∧C as was to be shown.
5 On the core interpretability logic IL(All)
Apart from the principles mentioned earlier in this paper the literature has
considered various other principles too. Some of those are
W: A⊲B → A⊲B ∧¬A
W∗: A⊲B → B ∧C ⊲B ∧C ∧¬A
P0: A⊲ ♦B → (A⊲B)
R: A⊲B → ¬(A ⊲ ¬C)⊲B ∧C
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In [11], IL(All) was conjectured to be ILW. In [13] this conjecture was
falsified and strengthened to a new conjecture, namely that ILW∗, which is a
proper extension of ILW, is IL(All). In [8] it was proven that the logic ILW∗P0
is a proper extension of ILW∗, and that ILW∗P0 is a subsystem of IL(All) (we
write ILW∗P0 instead of IL{W
∗,P0}). This falsified the conjecture from [13].
In [8] it is also conjectured that ILW∗P0 is not the same as IL(All).
In [7] it is conjectured that ILW∗P0 =IL(All) and this conjecture was refuted
in [4] by proving that the logic ILRW is a subsystem of IL(All) and a proper
extension of ILW∗P0.
It is easy to see that A⊲ ♦B → (A⊲ ♦B) ∈ ILP ∩ ILM. In [14] it was
shown however that A ⊲ ♦B → (A ⊲ ♦B) /∈ IL(All) thereby lowering the
upper bound IL(All) ⊆ ILP∩ ILM. Since A⊲♦B → (A⊲♦B) is reminiscent
of the modally incomplete principle P0, we remark here that the principle
A⊲B → ¬(A⊲ ♦C)⊲B ∧¬C
implies A⊲ ♦B → (A⊲ ♦B) so that it cannot be in IL(All) either.
The current paper raises the previously known lower bound of IL(All). How-
ever, it seems unlikely that this will be the end of the story and the two series
presented here seem amenable for interactions. Just by mere inspection of the
frame conditions we observe that
Fn = ∀w, x, y, z (B0(w, x, y, z)⇒ Gn(x, y, z)),
Fn = ∀w, x, y, z (Bn(w, x, y, z)⇒ G0(x, y, z)).
suggesting possible interactions. For example, a combination of R1 and R1 could
yield
A⊲B → (C ⊲A) ∧ ♦¬(C ⊲ ¬D) ∧ (E ⊲ ♦F )⊲B ∧D ∧ (E ⊲ F ).
We note that the two series presented in this paper only spoke of S relations
that were imposed by the frame conditions. This suggests that a new conjecture
can be formulated.
Let F be a class of IL-frames. By IL[F] we shall denote the interpretability
logic corresponding to this class. That is,
IL[F] := {A | ∀F ∈ F ∀valuationV 〈F, V 〉 |= A}.
We now define the class of frames All to be the set of frames where any S
relation that is implied both by the ILM and the ILP frame condition is present.
To make this more precise, let P denote the first-order frame condition of P
and let M denote the first-order frame condition of M. Let F (x, y, z) denote
any sentence –first or higher order– in the language {R, {Sx}x∈W }. We write
ILP |= F (x, y, z) → ySxz to denote that for any Veltman frame F for which
F |= P we also have F |= F (x, y, z) → ySxz. Likewise, we shall speak of
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ILM |= F (x, y, z)→ ySxz. With this notation, we define
All := {F |
(
ILP |= (F (x, y, z)→ ySxz) & ILM |= (F (x, y, z)→ ySxz)⇒
F |= (F (x, y, z)→ ySxz)
)
}.
The second author poses the new conjecture
Conjecture 5.1. IL(All) = IL[All].
It is easy to formulate the conjecture where the antecedent F (x, y, z) is
replaced by a set of sentences rather than a single sentence yet it seems hard to
imagine that this is needed. Note that the conjecture only speaks of principles
related to imposed S relations. For example, this will leave out a principle like
A⊲B → (♦A ∧C ⊲B ∧C) as formulated in [7].
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